



The President's Daily Brief

9 September 1971

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

9 September 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Preliminary analysis of the final portion of the current satellite reconnaissance mission reveals no additional Soviet ICBM silos of the smaller or larger type, but shows the new large silo liner segments at a fourth site. (Page 1)

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[redacted] Japan [redacted]

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Page 2.

[redacted] South Vietnam [redacted] (Page 3)

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[redacted] Chinese [redacted] (Page 4)

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
[redacted] USSR [redacted] Israel [redacted] (Page 5)

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In Pakistan, Yahya may have decided not to proceed with his announced plan to turn over power to civilians by late October. (Page 6)

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
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USSR

Preliminary analysis of the final portion of the current satellite reconnaissance mission reveals no additional ICBM silos of either the larger or the smaller type. There remain 66 of the smaller type under construction at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk, where the SS-11 is deployed. Twenty-five of the larger type have been identified at five of the six SS-9 complexes.



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


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
At least partial coverage was obtained of all 24 ICBM complexes and Pervomaysk and Derazhnya on this portion of the current mission.

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
JAPAN-US



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SOUTH VIETNAM



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the price of rice had gone up 25 percent during the past few days. (This is true.) This, [redacted] is always a certain indicator of popular apprehension.


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According to press reports, Thieu met on 7 September with all his top generals, including the four military region commanders and generals from the Ministry of Defense and the Joint General Staff.


Repeated consultations with these leaders are likely to bring them more actively into the political scene than at any time since 1968. This would open the possibility of a new period of political maneuvering in the military establishment. For his part, Thieu appears quite uncertain about how to handle the inflammatory Ky, as any steps against Ky could make the situation worse.

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COMMUNIST CHINA



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USSR-ISRAEL

At a recent meeting in Moscow, Arab diplomats concluded that the USSR and Israel are moving toward closer diplomatic contacts and will re-establish relations or contacts within four to six months. The Arabs apparently view the just concluded two-week visit of an Israeli peace delegation to the USSR and the visit of Soviet journalist Victor Louis to Israel in June as straws in the wind. An Israeli Foreign Ministry official remarked last month that he expected a Soviet proposal for an exchange of ambassadors in the next few months. He added that just prior to the Louis visit Moscow had proposed the establishment in Israel of a Soviet presence short of full diplomatic relations.

Since last May, when Mrs. Meir said that a dialogue between the two countries would be helpful, the Soviets have encouraged speculation about a rapprochement. They have also permitted an increase in the number of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel and of Israelis visiting the Soviet Union. Although a Soviet Foreign Ministry official dismissed the notion of renewing relations as premature, recent public remarks by Soviet officials in Moscow appear designed to clear the way for such a move.

The Israelis will probably continue to seek full restoration of formal relations; the Soviets, however, presumably are less interested in full-scale ties any time soon and will pursue informal contacts. Resumption of some kind of regular contact would provide both sides a useful channel to help in avoiding a new outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East and possibly in regularizing the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. Moscow may hope to use regular contacts or a normalization of relations to erode Washington's monopoly on efforts to arrange a settlement, but it will also have to consider the repercussions on the Arab states, including a possible Arab decision to invite a greater US presence in their capitals.

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PAKISTAN

The government has extended the time limit on filling vacant national and provincial assembly seats.

This move suggests that Yahya, who probably feels he cannot call the assemblies into session until the seats are filled, has decided against turning political power over to the civilians by late October, the date he set last June. He may feel he cannot keep to his original timetable because of the difficulty of holding elections in the East. He may also hope that additional time will help in the continuing effort to overcome the personal rivalries that up to now have blocked organization of a progovernment party. Such a party would serve both to field acceptable candidates in East Pakistan and to act as a counterweight to leftist ex-foreign minister Bhutto in the West.



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NOTES

Chile: The Chileans have embarked on an especially vicious campaign blaming the US for their country's economic problems. This may mean the Allende government is ready to adopt a tougher stance in relations with the US, particularly in the imminent negotiations with US copper companies and other firms over nationalized properties.

Malta: Claiming that talks with the UK are "stalemated," Mintoff has tightened the screws on London by halting the distribution of duty-free fuel to British forces on Malta.

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These developments follow a UK-NATO offer of almost \$24 million in cash and aid, and may be only the first in a series of harassing actions promised by Mintoff if the British failed to meet his demands.

Communist China:

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Communist China - North Korea: The agreement announced by the Chinese to provide free military aid to Pyongyang is the first of its kind known to have been concluded since the Korean war. Three weeks ago the two countries signed an economic cooperation protocol in Peking. These developments follow closely Premier Kim Il-sung's public expressions of support for Peking's invitation to President Nixon, and may represent payment for such endorsement. The agreements also serve as a public reaffirmation of close Sino - North Korean relations and of China's continuing support despite its initiatives toward the US.

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